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WHAT I have come to appreciate most in John Finnis’s work is hisurging us to return to the more classic as well as intellectually richer
notion of natural law espoused by St. Thomas Aquinas that builds on the
work of Aristotle and Cicero.  By that I mean a natural law that is focused
on the achievement of the good and ultimately on the achievement of
what, from the social perspective, we have come to call the common good.
This focus on the good as the basis of morality and the social organization
of human beings, as opposed to an approach focused on natural rights, is
refreshing.  It helps us see that, while law and morality are not exactly the
same, it is nevertheless impossible to separate law completely from moral-
ity.  From this perspective, all rights, whether called natural or legal, are
aimed at enhancing some good.  Some of the goods may be said to be
intermediate or instrumental goods, that is to say goods that are pursued
because they contribute to achieving the more basic and important goods
that stand at the apex of our moral universe.  As is well known, Finnis sets
forth a list of seven basic goods which he contends have been recognized
over the ages as fundamental for human flourishing and into which all
other goods that we might wish to consider as basic can be subsumed.1  I
am prepared to accept this list as an acceptable attempt to encapsulate, in
manageable form, the essence of the moral universe.  They are instantia-
tions of what Aquinas called the first principles of the natural law.  As such
they are each ends in themselves; they cannot serve merely as means to
achieving some other basic goods.  Looking at the world through this lens
alerts us to the fact that, when difficult situations arise in which the
achievement of one basic good requires the sacrifice of other basic goods,
the conflict can only be resolved by the exercise of what Aquinas called
prudentia and Aristotle called phronesis, that is to say through a process of
deliberation by rational human beings possessed of practical wisdom gar-
nered from a lifetime of experience and observation.  A major focus of
* James B. Duke Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law, Durham,
N.C.  With some minor changes this Article is a published version of a paper
delivered at the John F. Scarpa Conference on Law, Politics, and Culture, A
Celebration and Exploration of the Achievements of John M. Finnis, held at the
Villanova University School of Law on September 20, 2011.
1. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 59–99 (1980).
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this Article is whether this task can be delegated to the courts.  If this task
cannot easily be performed by the courts, it would strongly suggest that
there are limits to the degree that morality can be fully integrated into law.
Resolving conflicts among basic goods can be a very difficult process.
That is why people are attracted to the more structured moral universe of
natural rights and, to an even greater degree in legal discourse, to a legal
universe organized almost exclusively around the concept of legal rights.
Rights can serve the purpose of simplifying moral and legal deliberations
because in common speech we often do take literally Dworkin’s view of
“rights as trumps.”2  This is the strength of rights discourse and it is also its
weakness.  The strength of rights discourse is that it appears to eliminate
considerably the discretion of decision makers by greatly narrowing the
range of factors that they must take into account.  Its weakness is that it
not only may undervalue some important human goods but also, by sim-
plifying the decisional process, lessens the moral responsibility of judges
by passing that responsibility on to the authors of the legislation and con-
stitutions which the judges must construe and apply.  In the legal philo-
sophical debates with which we are concerned, this practical consideration
provides an additional impetus for wanting to separate a rigid rights-
bound domain of law from a more fluid and nuanced moral domain and
to insist on a sharp distinction between law and morality.  Likewise, in
moral debate, a morality founded largely on natural rights has similar in-
tellectual strengths and weaknesses.  It simplifies the moral universe by
narrowing the factors that must be considered and eases the moral burden
on people making difficult moral choices by transferring moral responsi-
bility for their decisions to some basic moral or religious text and/or to
some generally accepted moral or religious authority.
As interesting as the subject we are discussing might be, for a long
time in the modern era it would have been considered a matter of serious
concern only for academics.  That is no longer the case; and it is likely to
be a matter of increasing general concern for the foreseeable future.
Among the reasons why this is now the case are two important social devel-
opments about which many people, including myself, have extensively
written.  The first has been the increasing acceptance by modern devel-
oped societies that the state has a significant responsibility for protecting
and even promoting the economic and emotional welfare of its citizens.
This sense of increased social responsibility has been conjoined with the
rise of the contemporary human rights movement.  Political recognition
of human rights is not new.  Certainly the tradition of seeking recognition
for what could be called human rights has a long history in Western civili-
zation that, in the English-speaking world, can be traced back to the
Magna Carta issued in 1215, the English Bill of Rights of 1689, and, of
course, the American Bill of Rights of 1791 that consists of the first ten
2. See Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 155–68 (Jer-
emy Waldron ed., 1984).
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amendments to the United States’ Constitution.  Most of these rights were
narrowly focused and, for the most part, they were concerned with proce-
dural protections for persons involved not only in criminal prosecutions
but also in civil litigation.  Moreover, they were largely rights protecting
the individual against the state, that is leaving him free from state interfer-
ence such as not to be prosecuted twice for the same offense, or prevent-
ing him from employing counsel to assist him in his defense against
criminal prosecution, or forbidding the state to take his property without
compensation, or restricting his freedom of expression, or interfering with
the practice of his religion.  Aside from requiring the state to provide a
person a fair trial such as by providing him a trial by jury, none of these
enumerated “rights” concerned any affirmative obligation of the state to
do something for the individual, nor did they purport to be applicable to
all political societies.
The gradual recognition of a broader category of universal human
rights can be traced back to that most famous of all such documents, the
Declaration of the Rights of Man approved by the French National Assem-
bly in August of 1789, whose assertion of the existence of universal human
rights was repeated, in December 1948, in the promulgation of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights by the General Assembly of the
United Nations.  But, although expressed in universal terms, both the Dec-
laration of the Rights of Man and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, unlike the American Bill of Rights, were merely hortatory with no
immediate legal effect in any nation state.  This largely hortatory or aspira-
tional character of most enunciations of universal human rights gradually
changed as more nations in the post-World War II era, responding to
those broadly accepted aspirations, inserted express declarations of legally
enforceable human rights into their national constitutions.  And now, fi-
nally there are several transnational human rights conventions of which
the most presently significant, the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, covers the 47 coun-
tries that have thus far ratified it.
Who could complain about the ends which these developments are
trying to achieve?  The problems, as almost always, lie in the details of
implementation.  In the area of human rights these problems arise from
the interactions of a number of features of modern human rights conven-
tions and the national constitutions attempting to accomplish many of the
goals enunciated in international or multi-national human rights conven-
tions.  Some of these concern what we might call substantive features.
Others we might conveniently label as formal features; but they are as im-
portant as the substantive features, and particularly so for lawyers.  One
such formal feature is the entrusting of the determination of the content
of any asserted human right to the judicial decision-making process.  Con-
sideration of the implications of entrusting such an important role to the
judiciary will be a major part of the remainder of this Article.  To set the
stage for that discussion, however, we must first discuss some important
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substantive features that any such adjudicatory process is likely to
confront.
In order to keep the discussion within manageable bounds we shall
concentrate on three substantive human rights protected by the European
Convention.  It should be noted that the Convention does not claim to be
creating those rights.  It is merely concerned with recognizing them as
part of European law and creating the mechanism by which they may be
judicially protected.  The three rights which will be used to focus our dis-
cussion are the “right to respect for private and family life,” guaranteed by
Article 8, the right to “freedom of thought, conscience and religion,” in-
cluding one’s right “to manifest his religion or belief,” guaranteed by Arti-
cle 9, and the “right to freedom of expression” guaranteed by Article 10.
If one were to look only at the caption headings of these articles of the
Convention one could readily conclude that he is looking at a more elabo-
rate rendition of something like the Bill of Rights of the United States.
But as we all know there is more to this than that.  Each of these rights is
accompanied in the text by an express declaration that the right in ques-
tion may be limited by “law,” when “necessary in a democratic society,” for
economic, social, moral, and political reasons.  To take the right to free-
dom of religion as an example, the allowable limitations are those neces-
sary “in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order,
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.”
Qualified in this manner, these purported rights seem to be more like
what, in legal discourse, are usually called interests or values rather than
rights.  As such, these purported rights function merely as factors that
must be taken into account in the organization and management of the
social and political life of a society.  Thus, for example, the social purpose
of preserving the secular nature of society has been relied upon by the
European Court of Human Rights to uphold bans on women wearing
head scarves in public universities and in other educational institutions.3
Indeed in France it is now illegal for a woman to wear a burqa in public4
and in Switzerland, for the same reason, to build a structure with mina-
rets.5  Furthermore, in delimiting the scope of the freedom of expression
guaranteed by Article 10, the European Court of Human Rights has up-
held convictions for denying the Holocaust, even in private correspon-
3. See, e.g., Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 5
(Grand Chamber 2005); Dogru v. France, App. No. 27058/05, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2008).
4. Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 de interdisant la dissimulation du visage
dans l’espace public [Law 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010, on the Prohibition of
Concealing One’s Face in Public], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RE´PUBLIQUE FRANC¸AISE
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Oct. 12, 2011, p. 18344.
5. CONSTITUTION FE´DE´RALE [FEDERAL CONSTITUTION], Apr. 18, 1999, RO 101,
art. 72, para. 3 (Switz.), as amended by referendum in 2011.
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dence,6 without any showing of any advocacy of violence, let alone any
evidence that any such advocacy could reasonably be expected to make
such violence an imminent possibility.  It should also be noted in this re-
gard that all sorts of expression can and on occasion have also been sup-
pressed under Article 15 which permits “derogation” of these and many
other articles of the Convention in times of “war or other public emer-
gency threatening the life of the nation . . . to the extent strictly required
by the exigencies of the situation.”  Fortunately these last types of situa-
tions, such as the British attempts to suppress separatist movements in
Cypress and Northern Ireland as well as similar efforts in Turkey to deal
with Kurdish nationalists, are largely things of the past.7
To sum up the discussion thus far, ignoring the extreme national
emergency situations to which we have just referred and are now hopefully
only of historical interest, we still have a regime in which courts are re-
quired to decide whether the suppression of some basic moral value, such
as privacy, or religious expression or practice, or simply just expression
simpliciter, can be restricted in the name of the common good.  Because
the exercise of all these powers is clearly open to abuse, the Convention
requires that measures derogating from Articles 8, 9, and 10 must not only
be prescribed by law but also “necessary in a democratic” society to achieve
the social purposes for which the curtailment of the protected rights is
made; or in the case of Article 15 that the measures taken in emergency
situations are “strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.”  Be-
cause governments are not always disinterested or objective decision mak-
ers on these issues, all these derogations from protected human rights are
subject to a process of judicial review that eventually leads to the European
Court of Human Rights.  The assumption behind giving courts the last
word on what would seem to be important and often controversial moral
and political issues is obviously that there are right answers to these dis-
putes, and that courts are able to reach these correct answers.  That this
can be said to be possible in a world that is becoming increasingly diverse
and in which social morality is undeniably evolving is, to say the least,
questionable.
One might say that my concerns are overblown because the Conven-
tion itself requires that measures taken in derogation of the human rights
with which this paper is concerned must be “necessary,” and also, as the
European Court has often declared, “proportionate” to that necessity.8
6. See Witzsch v. Germany, App. No. 7485/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005); Witzsch v.
Germany, App. No. 41448/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999); see also Garaudy v. France,
App. No. 65831/01, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 369.
7. These cases and the issues they present have been discussed in GEORGE C.
CHRISTIE, PHILOSOPHER KINGS?  THE ADJUDICATION OF CONFLICTING HUMAN RIGHTS
AND SOCIAL VALUES 39–41 (2011) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHER KINGS?].
8. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep.
(Ser. A) at 25 (1978); Lawless v. Ireland, App. No. 332/57, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15
(1961).  For a scholarly discussion, see Marc-Andre´ Eissen, The Principle of Propor-
tionality in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN
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On its face that seems to be a good argument.  But if the need to preserve
the “secular” character of society can justify laws telling a woman what she
cannot wear in public, we are in trouble.  If a woman can go topless and
possibly naked in a public place the justification seems pretty thin.  Like-
wise the prohibition on Holocaust denial, even in private communication,
seems hard to justify, if it ever was, sixty-five years after the end of World
War II, when there is no actual incitement to the violent overthrow of the
existing social order and even less likelihood that any such advocacy would
actually result in a half-serious attempt to accomplish that goal.  It is partic-
ularly odd that such laws should be upheld when many European coun-
tries such as the United Kingdom have never criminalized Holocaust
denial.  A presumption against state derogation of rights is not that much
of a shield to an accused individual if it can so easily be overcome.
The really difficult issues, however, arise in disputes between individu-
als.  These are often intellectually more complex and certainly much more
frequent.  The frequency is considerably enhanced by two developments
in the evolving jurisprudence of the European Convention.  The first is
that on its face the European Convention would support an interpretation
that its provisions only concern actions of state actors.  And for a time, at
least in the United Kingdom,9 there actually was some uncertainty as to
whether and how it would apply in actions involving private persons based
on claims that the activities of a private person were interfering with the
ability of the plaintiff to enjoy interests recognized as important and pro-
tected against the actions of the state.  Not surprisingly, that uncertainty
did not long prevail.  Unlike the United States Bill of Rights, an eight-
eenth century document designed, as so pithily declared by Justice Doug-
las, “to take government off the backs of people and keep it off,”10 the
European Convention was almost from the beginning accepted by the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights as protecting not only the individual
against the actions of the state but also as imposing on the state the obliga-
tion to facilitate the ability of the individual to enjoy the rights guaranteed
by the Convention.11  Choosing to take this path has created the issue that
will concern us for the remainder of this Article and highlights the con-
trast between a legal world where morality is based on a system of natural
rights and one based on a moral universe, such as that favored by Finnis,
in which we are concerned with identifying and nurturing the basic goods
of human life.  What forces us to confront this challenge is that, among
the rights with which we are concerned, namely privacy, religion, and ex-
SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 125 (Ronald Macdonald et al. eds.,
1993).
9. See Basil S. Markesinis, Privacy, Freedom of Expression, and the Horizontal Effect
of the Human Rights Bill: Lessons from Germany, ll5 L.Q. REV. 47 (1999).
10. W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of Am. v. Clark, 389 U.S. 309, 318 (1967) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
11. See, e.g., A. v. United Kingdom, Original App. No. 2599/94, 27 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 611 (1998).
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pression, the rights of privacy and expression frequently come into con-
flict.  This possibility together with the defeasibility of these rights entails
that they really are only interests or, to use the terminology that we have
adopted in this Article, basic human goods.  Given the moral importance
of expression and privacy, in order to determine the correct decision,
when these two basic goods come in conflict the courts are required to
balance, in an ad hoc manner, the competing values and decide which
good should triumph in the case before them.  Conducting that balancing
exercise has been made particularly difficult because, undoubtedly
prompted by the tragic death of Princess Diana in 1997, the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1998 adopted a resolution that de-
clares that the rights of privacy and freedom of expression are of equal
value.12  That position was soon also expressly adopted by the European
Court of Human Rights.13
These European developments stand in marked contrast to the histor-
ical primacy that freedom of expression enjoyed in common law countries.
In common law countries, if the expression was true or merely opinion, or
even just vitriolic, expression would normally triumph over privacy so long
as the expression concerned matters that occurred in public or involved
information that was in the public domain.  Under this practice, expres-
sion might even be considered as a right in the relatively strong sense that
might qualify as a trump in the Dworkinian sense.  It was not that expres-
sion was accepted as a more important moral value, but that the political
value of expression was the principal concern of the body politic.  Histori-
cally, by contrast, expression did not get quite the same primacy in the
civil law countries of continental Europe where notions of personal honor
often trumped freedom of expression.14  From the end of the nineteenth
century, however, the reach of privacy expanded in the United States and
began to challenge on what are clearly moral grounds the primacy of ex-
pression to the extent that even the Restatement (Second) of Torts declared
that, if one disclosed information that “would be highly offensive to a rea-
sonable person, and . . . [was] not of legitimate concern to the public,”
one would be liable to that person even if the information was true and
lawfully acquired.15  This development raised obvious constitutional issues
that the Supreme Court of the United States was obliged to confront and,
over a relatively short period of time, the Supreme Court reinstated in an
enhanced form the primacy of freedom of expression on the ground that
12. EUR. PARL. ASS. Res. 1165, ¶ 11 (1998).
13. See, e.g., Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/00, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep.
1, at ¶ 42 (2004).  This case was reviewed by a Grand Chamber of the European
Court of Human Rights which adopted the reasoning of the earlier decision that
was rendered in the Third Section Chamber. Von Hannover v. Germany (No. 2),
App. No. 40660/08, 55 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15 (2012) (Grand Chamber).
14. James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Lib-
erty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151 (2004).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
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this primacy was mandated by the First Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States.16  Whether that enhanced primacy will continue given
the ideological splits in the present Court is not an issue that we can profit-
ably discuss on this occasion.  What seems clear is that whatever course the
Court may take in the future, there is no possibility that privacy and ex-
pression will be treated as of equal value.
The law of the United Kingdom, however, which had heretofore re-
fused even to recognize a right of privacy, had surprisingly little difficulty
in adjusting to the changes mandated by its membership in the Council of
Europe and then in the European Union.  Building on an expanded no-
tion of confidentiality which did not arise out of any sort of pre-existing
confidential or fiduciary relationship, its courts have ruled that someone
who happens to learn, however innocently, of embarrassing information
about another that is not generally known and would realize that a reason-
able person would not want to be generally known is under an obligation
not to disclose that information to others.17  Through this doctrinal shift it
was possible, without much difficulty, to begin the process of adjusting the
common law of the United Kingdom to the requirements of the European
Convention as declared by the European Court of Human Rights.  The
courts of the United Kingdom have also not had much difficulty in re-
sponding to the declarations of the European Court that even public
figures and politicians enjoy some rights of privacy even for activities that
take place in the public sphere, particularly when some element of family
life is involved.  For example, the Court of Appeal has held that a newspa-
per could not publish photographs of the nineteen-month-old son of J.K.
Rowling, while the child was being pushed by his father in a buggy as he
accompanied his parents to and from a cafe´.18  There is, however, a New
Zealand case practically on all fours in which a unanimous court reached
the opposite conclusion.19
How do courts decide these difficult cases particularly if, as in Europe,
privacy and expression are said to be of equal value?  In a recent book20 I
have described at length the process by which the law in Europe has
evolved to its current state and have argued that it is not a satisfactory
treatment of the matter but should rather serve as a cautionary lesson to
those who want to introduce the European perspective into the law of the
United States.  For present purposes a simplified summary may suffice.
Roughly speaking, if expression about lawfully obtained information is
challenged as plausibly invading someone’s privacy, the challenge will be
upheld unless the speaker can persuade the court that the expression in
16. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491
U.S. 524 (1989).
17. See Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] 2 A.C. 457 (H.L.).
18. Murray v. Express Newspapers LLC, [2008] 3 W.L.R. 1360 (C.A.).
19. Hosking v Runting, [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA).
20. See generally PHILOSOPHER KINGS?, supra note 7.
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question concerns a matter of legitimate public interest.21  In the United
Kingdom, expression concerning political, scientific, educational, or artis-
tic matters have been mentioned as being types of expression that would
more likely be judged to be of legitimate public interest.22  In a similar
vein, the European Court of Human Rights has declared that, for the
speaker to escape liability, the challenged expression must be shown to
contribute “to a debate of general interest” to society.23  For both the Brit-
ish courts and the European Court, the fact that the matter is of interest to
a significant portion of the public—if it were not, it would probably not be
in the interest of the publisher to engage in the expression in question—is
in no way determinative.  In the view of both the British courts and the
European Court, it is for those courts to determine what really is a matter
of public interest or concern.
Why speech has to have any purpose escapes me.  Why can it not be
an end in itself?  But that of course is a question that is too big even to
begin discussing here.  It is important to note the consequences of this
approach.  Since it is hard, as a practical matter, to conceive of a situation
in which a speaker asserts that a private person’s presumptively lawful pri-
vacy is restricting his freedom of expression, it is not surprising that all the
cases that have thus far come before the courts have involved situations in
which it is the speaker who, though the defendant, is faced with the bur-
den of justifying his expression.  In dissenting from this view of the gov-
erning law, Judge David Thu¨r Bjo¨rgvinsson of the European Court of
Human Rights declared that under the present test it was the expression
which must be justified and not the restriction, whereas he was of the
opinion that it was the restriction that needed justification.24  That is a
position with which I heartily agree.  Regardless of whether one agrees
with Judge Bjo¨rgvinsson, one thing is clear: in a world of conflicting
human rights of equal value, as a practical matter one or the other will
become the preferred value.  In Europe it is privacy which is predominant;
in the United States, where there is no pretense that the values are equal,
expression is clearly the preferred value.  What I want to explore is how
the courts could decide such cases while honoring the presupposition that
conflicting values are in fact equal and also recognizing that we are really
concerned with basic goods in the moral sense and not merely legal or
political constructs.
21. See generally Campbell, supra note 17. For similar treatment of the conflict
between privacy and expression in the European Court of Human Rights, see gen-
erally Von Hannover, supra note 13.
22. See Campbell, supra note 17 at ¶¶ 148–49 (per Lady Hale).
23. Von Hannover, supra note 13 at ¶ 76.
24. See MGN Ltd. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 39401/04, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R.
66.  This proceeding was brought to the European Court to overturn the decision
in the Campbell case.  In a unanimous decision the Court held that the amount
awarded to Ms. Campbell for attorneys’ fees was excessive.  In his brief dissent,
however, as noted in the text, Judge Bjo¨rgvinsson disagreed with his colleagues’
upholding of Ms. Campbell’s victory on the merits.
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To confine this discussion to manageable dimensions we have been
focusing on the judicial struggle to decide a conflict between the two basic
human goods, expression and privacy, which are stipulated as being of
equal moral value and, in making that decision, the courts are required to
determine whether some challenged expression concerns a matter of “le-
gitimate” public concern.  Admittedly, both privacy and expression can be
evaluated on other scales as well, such as that of comparative political
value or formal legal value, but that just complicates the matter because it
forces us to confront the apples and oranges problem and somehow at-
tempt to deal with that problem by working out the comparative weight of
the competing political and other values involved in the situation under
review, and then include them in an equation in which the comparative
moral value of expression and privacy in the instant case is also included.
One might say that this just amounts to asking decision makers to exercise
practical wisdom and of course that is true.  But while judges do and must
make some resort to practical wisdom in performing their normal tasks,
the reason decisions involving basic moral values are referred to judges is
because it is felt that they can also somehow discover the truly correct
moral solution.  It is not of course irrational to believe that there is an
objective moral order and therefore a morally correct solution to every
moral conflict.  The problem is how may human beings arrive at that cor-
rect solution.
Declarations that expression or privacy or any other value is a basic
good do not get one very far when these goods come in conflict.  To meet
the challenge there must be something unique about judicial reasoning or
something other than a judge’s intuition to which he can refer if his deci-
sion is questioned.  Courts, including the European Court of Human
Rights, often refer to the social morality of their communities, but courts
have also been known to refuse to follow the social morality of their com-
munities on the ground that it conflicts with some more basic moral con-
vention.  Is this, what a cynic might argue, just imposing on society at large
the morality of the social classes from which the judges are drawn under
the guise of appealing to some consensus of right-thinking people such as
Stendhal’s “happy few”?  Dealing with the problem is not made any easier
by the fact that social morality can change, sometimes rather rapidly, as
the European Court of Human Rights has recognized in cases involving
obscenity and blasphemy.25  It is worth considering that all these difficult
questions arise because we are asking the courts to do something that, as a
practical matter, is impossible.  One should not ignore an observation
made by David Hume when he contrasted an artificial virtue like justice to
25. See, e.g., Mu¨ller v. Switzerland, App. No. 10737/84, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 212
(1988), in which the Court accepted that what was punishable as obscenity in 1960
might not be punishable in 1980.  One might compare also Otto Preminger In-
stitut v. Austria, App. No. 13470/87, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 34 (1994), with Ver-
einigung Bildender Ku¨nstler v. Austria, App. No. 68354/01, 47 Eur. H.R. Rep. 5
(2007).
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the natural virtues.  Natural virtues exist in a universe in which the morally
right result is dependent on the totality of all the circumstances, that is to
say, in a moral world in which situation ethics reigns.  An artificial virtue
such as justice is, for Hume, marked by bright line rules in which many
morally important features are intentionally ignored.26  A moral gymnast
such as Dworkin’s Hercules27 might be able to bridge that gap between
morality and law but, for most people, only God would be adequate to the
task.
My conclusion is that, if these goods are accepted as being of equal
value, it is chimerical to ask judges to decide conflicts between those basic
human goods, while avoiding the criticism that they are reaching arbitrary
and often inconsistent decisions in the extremely fact-dependent situa-
tions in which those conflicts are presented to courts.  As judges that have
decided such cases have themselves admitted, these are the types of cases
in which different judges may reach different conclusions on the same
facts.28  As a practical matter, if any measure of consistency is to be
achieved, one or the other of the conflicting basic goods will be given
primacy in the sense that, when challenged, one of these values will “bear
the burden” of persuading the decision maker that it should prevail.  That
has happened in the different approaches taken in Europe and in the
United States in conflicts between expression and privacy.  Religions can
handle conflicts between basic human goods by resort to God or to some
human being who is accepted as having the insight and authority to make
those decisions.  As revered as courts, including the United States Su-
preme Court, might be, they will never be able to achieve that stature.  It is
not coincidental that, since the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms became incorporated into
the domestic law of the United Kingdom, the number of sharply divided
decisions in the House of Lords and now in the Supreme Court of the
United Kingdom has very markedly increased.29
All societies, of course, are faced with the need to make decisions
involving choices between basic human goods.  These decisions require
the talents of statesmen, that is of people who have the practical wisdom to
make the best possible decisions taking into account all factors, including
26. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 526–34 (L. A. Selby-Bigge
ed., Clarendon Press 1888) (1740).
27. The most prominent reference to such a super-judge is RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
28. In Campbell, supra 17 at ¶ 188, Lord Carswell, who was part of the majority
in a three-to-two decision, conceded that “[w]eighing and balancing these factors
is a process which may well lead different people to different conclusions.”  In that
case five of the nine judges who heard the case as it worked its way through the
courts actually ruled against Ms. Campbell.  A similar recognition that the “casuis-
tic approach” taken in these sorts of cases “may also give rise to differences of
opinion” was expressed by Judge Cabral Barreto in his concurring judgment in Von
Hannover, supra note 13.
29. See PHILOSOPHER KINGS?, supra note 7, at 18.
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the common good, and what is physically and socially possible that in any
given situation may have morally relevant significance.  In a democratic
society these decisions have to be made by actors who are politically ac-
countable for their decisions.  Those are the people who are ideally posi-
tioned to operate in the Aquinian world that Finnis has reinvigorated.  For
the courts I am afraid they must operate in a world of rights.  If these
rights are to be called natural rights and to function as rights in the sense
that Wesley Hohfeld described, such rights should be narrowly focused
and have real bite.  They should not be worded in broad and grandiose
terms claiming a universal validity that almost guaranties their being used
as shibboleths to give an aura of legitimacy to practical decisions about
practical matters.  Indeed, there is something to be said for banning the
concept of “natural” rights from legal discourse.  The inevitable misuse of
the concept of natural rights invites the mistaken reaction that law and
morality are and should be separate universes.  As Finnis reminds us, that
conclusion is false.  Even though law and morality are different, they are
inevitably interconnected.  As I hope I have shown, however, there are
many theoretical and practical reasons why they can never be the same.
Perhaps the most important is that, in order to serve its important func-
tion of providing consistency and predictability, law must always display an
ineradicable measure of arbitrariness.
